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NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 
Respondent State of Idaho, by and through its Attorney General, Lawrence G. Wasden, 
submits the following supplemental authority pursuant to Rule 34(f), I.AR. 
On February 10, 2009, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued its decision in 
Department of Health and Human Services v. Scott Maybee, 2009 WL 307474 (Me.) The 
Court's reasoning at *2 and *3 of the Westlaw cite is relevant to the arguments in Section IV.I. 
(p. 36) and Section IV.J. (p. 38) of Respondent's brief. A Westlaw copy of the decision is 
attached. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of March, 2009. 
By: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
~~:}(~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
Consumer Protection Division 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of March, 2009, I caused to be served two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing instrument by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
J. Walter Sinclair 
W. Christopher Pooser 
Stoel Rives LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Margaret A Murphy 
54 Hollywood Ave. 
Buffalo, NY 14220 
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BRETT T. DeLANGE 
Deputy Attorney General 
NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY - 2 
--- A.2d ----
--- A.2d ----, 2009 WL 307474 (Me.), 2009 ME 15 
(Cite as: 2009 WL 307474 (Me.)} 
jurisdiction is lacking. In Williams and Kennerly, 
the United States Supreme Court held that the state 
courts of Arizona and Montana, respectively, 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because these 
states had not accepted jurisdiction over Native 
Americans on reservations. Williams, 358 U.S. at 
222-23, 79 S.Ct. 269;Kennerly, 400 U.S. at 425-27, 
91 S.Ct. 480. 
['II 8] Maybee's reliance on Williams and Kennerly 
is misplaced. Those cases discuss activity that took 
place entirely within the reservation, and, for that 
reason, do not provide guidance here. Both involve 
collection actions by merchants with stores on re-
servations against Native Americans who pur-
chased goods on credit at those stores. Williams, 
358 U.S. at 217- 18, 79 S.Ct. 269;Kennerly, 400 
U.S. at 424, 9 I S.Ct. 480.As mentioned above, 
Maybee's customers are not on the reservation. 
They buy their cigarettes through the Internet or by 
mail order, and accept delivery in Maine. 
['II 9] Maybee's preemption argument is based on 
the same flawed premise; he asserts that because 
his businesses are physically located on the reserva-
tion when they accept orders, his transactions are 
governed by the law applicable to activities that oc-
cur within reservation boundaries. Maybee argues 
that 22 M.R.S. 1555-C(l) is preempted by federal 
law that restricts state authority over Native Amer-
icans conducting activities within reservations, cit-
ing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 
U.S. 136, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (I 980), 
and Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes 
of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 
I 634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (I 976).FN2 
['II 10] In White Mountain Apache Tribe, the United 
States Supreme Court held that preemption is one 
of two "independent but related barriers" to the ex-
ercise of state authority over tribal reservations and 
members. 448 U.S. at 142-43, 100 S.Ct. 
2578.Because the Indian Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution grants Congress the 
power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, fed-
eral law may preempt state law in some areas. Id. at 
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142, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 
3). However, there is no federal statute, federal reg-
ulation, or other federal law that preempts Maine's 
tobacco vendor licensing requirement. 
*3 ['II 11] The other barrier arises when state regula-
tion infringes on tribal self-government and re-
quires an inquiry or balancing test that the Court 
applies when the state seeks to regulate conduct 
that takes place entirely on a reservation. Id. at 142, 
144-45, 100 S.Ct. 2578.In cases involving the on-
reservation conduct of persons who are not Native 
American, the Court balances the tribe's interest in 
self-government against the state's interest in regu-
lating on-reservation activity. Wagnon v. Prairie 
Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 99, 126 
S.Ct. 676, 163 L.Ed.2d 429 (2005) (citing White 
Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 144, 100 S.Ct. 
2578). 
['II 12] The balancing test described in White Moun-
tain Apache Tribe and Wagnon is inapplicable to 
the present case because Maybee's interactions with 
consumers in Maine extend beyond the boundaries 
of the reservation. Activity of tribal members that 
takes place within the reservation but has an impact 
outside the reservation may be regulated by the 
states. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 362-66, 121 
S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (200 I) (holding that, 
in the absence of federal legislation to the contrary, 
the state has the authority to execute a search war-
rant on a reservation against a tribal member sus-
pected of violating state law outside the reserva-
tion). 
['II 13] The United States Supreme Court's holdings 
regarding vendor licensing requirements in Rice v. 
Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 720, 103 S.Ct. 3291, 77 
L.Ed.2d 961 (1983), and Moe, 425 U.S. at 480-81, 
96 S.Ct. 1634 support Maine's enforcement of its 
tobacco vendor licensing requirements against 
Maybee. In Rice, the Court held that alcohol vendor 
licensing requirements, as applied to a tribal mem-
ber on a reservation seeking to sell to persons who 
are not Native American, do not infringe upon tri-
bal self-government. 463 U.S. at 720, 103 S.Ct. 
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[1 14] Maybee argues that Rice is distinguishable 
because it involves a federal statute that grants 
states and tribes the authority to regulate alcohol 
sales on Indian reservations, id at 715, 726-27, 103 
S.Ct. 3291 whereas there is no corresponding feder-
al statute granting states the authority to regulate 
tobacco sales on reservations. 1:Jowever, the Court 
states in Rice: 
fo the extent that [the alcohol vendor] seeks to sell 
to non-Indians, or to Indians who are not mem-
bers of the tribe with jurisdiction over the reser-
vation on which the sale occurred, the decisions 
of this Court have already foreclosed (the 
vendor's] argument that the licensing require-
ments infringe upon tribal sovereignty. 
Id at 720, 103 S.Ct. 3291. 
(1 15] Contrary to Maybee's contentions, Rice has 
applicability beyond alcohol vendor license fees be-
cause the Court explicitly relies upon prior de-
cisions concerning other types of fees. One of those 
decisions is Moe, which deals with a tobacco 
vendor license fee. Rice, 463 U.S. at 720 n. 7, 103 
S.Ct. 3291 (citing Moe, 425 U.S. at 475-76, 96 
S.Ct. 1634). The Court struck down the fee in Mae, 
but under distinguishable facts, in that the state 
sought to enforce it against a Oreservation Indian 
conducting a cigarette business for the Tribe, on re-
servation land.6 425 U.S. at 480-81, 96 S.Ct. 
1634.Maybee, in contrast, conducts his transactions 
with consumers in Maine in furtherance of his 
private business. The Department therefore has the 
authority to enforce the tobacco vendor licensing 
requirement against Maybee. See Rice, 463 U.S. at 
720, I 03 S.Ct. 329 I. 
*4 The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
FN I. The United States Supreme Court has 
noted that persons who are not members of 
a tribe are not "constituents of the govern-
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ing Tribe." Washington v. Corifederated 
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 
447 U.S. 134, 161, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 
L.Ed.2d IO ( 1980). Maybee presumably 
asserts his status as an enrolled member to 
support his arguments on subject matter 
jurisdiction and preemption. 
FN2. The United States Supreme Court re-
cently held that two other provisions of the 
Maine law governing tobacco sales, 22 
M.R.S. I 555-C(3)(C), 1555-D (2008), are 
preempted by a federal statute, Rowe v. 
N.H. Motor Transp. AssOn, 552 U.S. ----, 
128 S.Ct. 989, 993, 169 L.Ed.2d 933 
(2008), but those provisions are not at is-
sue in the present case. 
Me.,2009. 
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